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Abstract 
Governments are increasingly adopting behavioral science techniques for changing individual 
behavior in pursuit of policy objectives. The types of “nudge” interventions that governments are 
now adopting alter people’s decisions without resorting to coercion or significant changes to 
economic incentives. We calculate ratios of impact to cost for nudge interventions and for 
traditional policy tools, such as tax incentives and other financial inducements, and we find that 
nudge interventions often compare favorably to traditional interventions. We conclude that 
nudging is a valuable approach that should be used more in conjunction with traditional policies, 
but more relative effectiveness calculations are needed. 
 
Keywords: nudge, nudge unit, choice architecture, behavioral science, behavioral 
economics, savings, pension plan, education, college enrollment, energy, electricity usage, 
preventive health, influenza vaccination, flu shot 
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Introduction 
Recent evidence indicates that the burgeoning field of behavioral science can help solve a 
wide range of policy problems (Halpern, 2015; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Johnson et al., 2012; 
Larrick & Soll, 2008; Ly, Mazar, Zhao, & Soman, 2013; Sunstein, 2013; Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008; World Bank, 2015). In response, governments are increasingly interested in using 
behavioral insights as a supplement to or replacement for traditional economic levers, such as 
incentives, to shape the behavior of citizens and government personnel to promote public 
priorities. A number of governments around the world have formed “nudge units”: teams of 
behavioral science experts tasked with designing behavioral interventions with the potential to 
encourage desirable behavior without restricting choice, testing those interventions rapidly and 
inexpensively, and then widely implementing the strategies that prove most effective. The United 
Kingdom established a nudge unit in 2010 and was soon followed by other countries, including 
Australia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Singapore as well as the United States, where an 
Executive Order issued in September 2015 directed federal agencies to incorporate behavioral 
science into their programs (Obama, 2015). Of course, it is important to emphasize that 
behaviorally informed approaches can also be implemented by agencies without the use of 
designated nudge units. 
A key feature of behavioral strategies is that they aim to change “people’s behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, [an]…intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. 
Nudges are not mandates” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudges do not impose material costs but 
instead alter the underlying “choice architecture,” for example by changing the default option to 
take advantage of people’s tendency to accept defaults passively. Nudges stand in contrast to 
SHOULD GOVERNMENTS INVEST MORE IN NUDGING? 4 
 
 
traditional policy tools, which change behavior with mandates or bans or through economic 
incentives (including significant subsidies or fines). 
 For example, a behaviorally informed policy intervention might automatically enroll 
people in programs designed to reduce poverty (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2013), 
eliminate or reduce paperwork requirements for obtaining licenses or permits, or streamline the 
process of applying for government financial aid for college attendance (Bettinger, Long, 
Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu, 2012). Many nudges have this general form; they simplify 
processes to make benefits more readily available. As governments decide on the appropriate 
resources to invest in nudge policies, an important question is how efficiently nudge initiatives 
achieve their objectives. A nudge policy that increases engagement in a desired behavior (e.g., 
college attendance) by a larger amount per dollar spent than a traditional intervention would be 
an attractive investment of public resources. 
This point may seem obvious, and some nudges do produce self-evidently large 
behavioral changes (Benartzi and Thaler, 2013). But because extremely cost-effective nudges do 
not always create large absolute shifts in behavior, scholars and policy makers may 
underappreciate their value in the absence of cost-effectiveness calculations. As a motivating 
case study for assessing the cost effectiveness (rather than merely the effectiveness) of nudge 
policies, consider an experiment conducted by the White House Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Team (SBST)—the U.S. nudge unit—in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD). 
This experiment sought to increase savings among military personnel in the defined 
contribution retirement plan offered to federal government employees, a setting where the 
government already offers monetary incentives for saving (retirement plan contributions are tax-
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deductible). In the experiment, 806,861 military service members who were not contributing to 
the plan received emails nudging them to begin contributing (except for a control group, which 
received no email—the business-as-usual practice). The emails were experimentally varied to 
test different behaviorally-informed strategies for increasing sign-ups (see SOM-U for further 
information on the experiment and its results). The business-as-usual control group had a 1.1% 
savings plan enrollment rate over the month following the messaging campaign, while the groups 
who received emails had enrollment rates ranging from 1.6% to 2.1%.  
At first blush, this campaign’s impact seems modest. However, the incremental 
administrative costs of developing and deploying the email campaign were just $5,000, and the 
messages collectively increased savings plan enrollment by roughly 5,200 people and increased 
contributions by more than $1.3 million in just the first month post-experiment.1 If we 
extrapolate and assume that the intervention’s effect decays linearly to zero over one year (a 
highly conservative assumption given the stickiness of savings plan contributions), the program 
increased savings by approximately $8 million total. Thus, the intervention generated $1,600 in 
additional savings per dollar spent by the government, an impact that is more than one hundred 
times larger than the impact per dollar spent by the government on tax incentives, as we calculate 
later in this paper. This case study demonstrates that nudge policies do not need to produce a 
large impact in absolute terms to be effective. 
                                                            
1 This estimate is relative to our estimate of what would have happened had everyone been in the control group. To 
estimate the overall effect of the email campaign on enrollment, we ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
with an indicator for enrollment as the outcome variable and with only a constant and an indicator variable for 
receiving an email as the explanatory variables. Multiplying the point estimate (and the endpoints of the 95% 
confidence interval) for the coefficient on the email indicator variable by the number of individuals who received 
emails, we estimate that the email campaign increased savings program enrollment by 5,265 people (95% CI: 4,563-
5,968). Using the same methodology, we also estimate that the email campaign increased total contributions to 
retirement accounts in the month following the email campaign by $1,367,423. Note that this last calculation 
excludes Marines and is therefore an understatement of the effect. 
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Past studies on nudges, including those disseminated by existing nudge units, have 
typically measured only the extent to which an intended behavior was changed (if at all). To be 
maximally informative, future policy-oriented behavioral science research should measure the 
impact per dollar spent on behavioral interventions in comparison to more traditional 
interventions. In the absence of such calculations, policymakers lack the evidence needed to 
design optimal policies and to decide on the appropriate allocation of resources across 
behaviorally-informed and traditional interventions. 
Method 
Study Selection Criteria 
We formed a list of policy areas by combining the focus areas from the 2015 summary 
reports of the U.S. and U.K. nudge units (Social and Behavioral Sciences Team, 2015; 
Behavioural Insights Team, 2015), eliminating redundancies and excluding areas that are not 
major domestic policy foci for the U.S. government. Within each category, we identified one 
well-defined behavior to be our outcome variable of interest.  The SOM-R details our selection 
methodology. In short, when a policy area had an obvious behavior to focus on, the choice was 
simple (e.g., in “Energy,” we focus on energy consumption). When there was no obvious target, 
we looked to the outcome variable emphasized by the SBST. If the policy area was not studied 
by SBST, we looked to the outcome variable emphasized by the BIT. Table 1 displays the SBST 
and BIT policy areas of focus, our categorization of these areas, areas that were excluded, and 
outcomes variables of interest. 
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Table 1. 
Categorization of all focus areas listed in the SBST 2015 Annual Report and the BIT 2013-2015 
Update Report and corresponding outcome variables. 
 
Our 
Categorization 
Corresponding Focus 
Area(s) in SBST 2015 
Annual Report 
Corresponding Focus 
Area(s) in BIT 2013-2015 
Update Report 
Outcome Variable of Interest 
Financial 
Security in 
Retirement 
Promoting Retirement 
Security 
Empowering Consumersa Retirement savings 
Education Improving College 
Access & 
Affordability 
Education College enrollment among 
recent high school graduates 
Energy n/a Energy & Sustainability Energy consumption 
Health Helping Families Get 
Health Coverage & 
Stay Healthy 
Health & Wellbeing Adult outpatient influenza 
vaccinations 
Job Training Advancing Economic 
Opportunity 
Economic Growth & the 
Labour Market 
Skills & Youth 
Enrollment in job training 
programsc 
Program 
Integrity & 
Compliance 
Promoting Program 
Integrity & 
Compliance 
Fraud, Error & Debtb Compliance with paying a 
required fee to the governmentc 
Home Affairs n/a Home Affairs Reducing crimes such as illegal 
migration, mobile phone theft, 
and online exploitationc 
Note: Our list excludes the following SBST and BIT focus areas because they are not major areas of 
domestic policy for the U.S. government: Ensuring Cost-Effective Program Operations (SBST), Giving & 
Social Action (BIT), International Development (BIT), and Work with Other Governments (BIT). 
aWe group this focus area with SBST’s Promoting Retirement Security area because its leading example 
has to do with pensions. 
bWe group this focus area with SBST’s Promoting Program Integrity & Compliance area because both 
focus on improving tax and fee collection. 
cIn “Job Training,” “Program Integrity & Compliance,” and “Home Affairs,” the targeted behaviors were 
not studied in published research papers in leading academic journals from 2000 to mid-2015 (see below 
for an explanation of our journal selection criteria), so we exclude these areas from our analysis. 
 
We next searched leading academic journals for original research, published from 2000 
to mid-2015, studying interventions aimed at directly influencing outcome variables of interest. 
Using Google Scholar to determine academic journal rankings,2 we limited our set of academic 
journals to Google Scholar’s three leading general interest journals (Science, Nature, and 
                                                            
2 Top Publications. (September 29, 2015). Retrieved from https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=top_venues 
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Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences); three leading economics journals, excluding 
finance journals (American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of 
Economics and Statistics); three leading psychology journals, excluding journals that publish 
only review articles (Psychological Science, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, and 
Journal of Applied Psychology); and, in the case of Health, three leading general medical 
journals (New England Journal of Medicine, Lancet, and Journal of the American Medical 
Association). 
Criteria for inclusion in our analyses were: the entire research paper was available online; 
the paper analyzed a (i) nudge, (ii) tax incentive, (iii) reward, or (iv) educational program 
targeting one of the dependent variables of interest; and the paper presented the necessary 
information to construct relative effectiveness calculations, or we could obtain this information 
by contacting the author(s). (Note that reminders and streamlined or salient disclosure policies 
can qualify as nudges, but for present purposes, we do not count traditional educational programs 
as such.) If our search for papers studying a given outcome variable did not identify a paper that 
met our inclusion criteria, we dropped that outcome variable from our analysis. If our search for 
papers studying a given outcome variable identified papers that met our inclusion criteria and 
that covered some but not all of the four intervention types above, we attempted to fill the gaps 
by widening our search. 
Our method for choosing dependent variables for inclusion in our relative effectiveness 
analysis ensured the selection of outcomes for which the ex ante belief of policy makers was that 
nudges had a chance to impact behavior. This method likely gave an advantage to nudges over 
incentives and educational interventions in our relative effectiveness calculations. However, it 
may be appropriate to confer this advantage if policy makers are indeed selective in applying 
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nudges where they have a high potential for impact. Furthermore, we are careful to focus only on 
settings of major domestic policy interest,3 making our findings highly policy-relevant regardless 
of any selection concerns.4 
Relative Effectiveness Calculations 
We offer a comparison between the effectiveness of behaviorally-motivated policies and 
the effectiveness of standard policies by using a single measure that takes both the cost of a 
program and its impact into account. Specifically, we examine the ratio between an 
intervention’s causal effect on a given outcome variable and its (inflation-adjusted) 
implementation cost.5 
Our definition of the impact of an intervention follows from the main findings of the 
paper reporting on it. When a paper studies the effect of an intervention on multiple outcome 
variables or target populations, we select the outcome and target population that are most 
comparable to the outcomes and target populations studied in other papers on the same topic.6 
We often need to make additional assumptions to produce intervention cost estimates. Some 
interventions affect an outcome by increasing take-up of another program that affects the 
outcome.7 One may argue that in these situations, interventions have additional, indirect costs 
                                                            
3 See, for example, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017. (September 13, 2016). Retrieved 
from https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview 
4 Another potential concern is that our process for selecting research papers might be likely to identify false-positive 
results. We have conducted p-curve analyses for the key results identified by our process. The collection of results 
concerning nudge interventions has evidential value, as does the collection of results concerning traditional 
interventions. See the SOM-U. 
5 We adjust all costs to June 2015 levels using the annual CPI from the year of intervention. For multi-year 
interventions, we adjust using the midpoint year. 
6 For example, Bettinger et al. (2012) study the effect of Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) 
assistance on FAFSA completion rates, college attendance rates, Pell Grant receipt rates, and years of postsecondary 
education for both traditional and non-traditional students. We focus on the effect on college attendance rates among 
traditional students for comparability with other studies. 
7 For example, Bettinger et al. (2012) provided assistance in completing the FAFSA to increase college enrollment 
through improved access to financial aid. Milkman, Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011) and Chapman, Li, 
Colby, and Yoon (2010) used nudges to encourage take-up of flu shots during free vaccination campaigns. 
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because they increase the use of other programs. However, in most of cases we study, the 
intervention simply encourages use of existing, under-capacity institutions in a way that better 
fulfills those institutions’ missions. Some interventions may create perverse outcomes that are 
costly, and in those situations, we explicitly account for those costs.8 That said, we do not 
include any indirect costs that result from increases in the intended use of other, existing 
institutions. 
In most cases, the different interventions we study within a domain operate over similar 
time horizons. We evaluate retirement savings interventions over a horizon of one year. 
Similarly, college education interventions are measured in terms of their impact on annual 
enrollment, and influenza vaccination interventions operate over the course of a single year’s 
vaccination cycle (approximately September through December). In contrast, results from energy 
conservation interventions are reported for time horizons ranging from a few months to several 
years, and we note these differences when discussing energy conservation calculations. 
However, even in the case of energy conservation interventions, our relative effectiveness 
calculations provide useful guidance to policy makers who apply a low intertemporal discount 
rate to future financial costs and energy savings. 
Some experimental studies have multiple treatment arms, and experimenters incur 
research costs (e.g., data collection costs, participant payments) for all study arms, including the 
control group. Treatment effects are estimated based on the marginal increase in the outcome 
variable in the treatment group over the control group, and we calculate intervention costs in the 
same way: as the marginal cost of the treatment over the cost of the control. We further focus our 
                                                            
8 An instance of a costly side effect occurs with the Chapman et al. (2010) implementation of an opt-out vaccination 
appointment system, which increased no-shows at the vaccination clinic. 
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attention on capturing the primary costs for each intervention, and we omit the costs of any 
minor unreported aspects of the program.9 
Of course, relative effectiveness calculations do not address the question of whether 
increasing the behavior in question is socially beneficial. Our approach is to take stated 
government goals as given and then to address how best those goals can be achieved. 
Results 
We now describe the results of our relative effectiveness calculations, summarized in 
Table 2 and Figure 1. Except where noted, monetary amounts are reported in 2015 dollars. 
Readers interested in additional details should consult the SOM-U. 
Increasing Retirement Savings 
Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2009) studied an active decision nudge for 
retirement savings. A company’s new employees were required to indicate their preferred 
contribution rate in a workplace savings plan within their first month of employment. Compared 
to an enrollment system that asked employees to choose a contribution rate on their own and that 
implemented a default contribution rate of zero for employees who had not chosen another rate, 
the active decision nudge increased the average contribution rate in the first year of employment 
by more than one percent of pay. The nudge is effective because it ensures that procrastination 
will not prevent new employees from signing up for the plan (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 2001). 
We conservatively apply the one percentage point average contribution rate increase to an 
annual salary of $20,000 (well below these employees’ median income), for a contribution 
                                                            
9 This may lead us to account for a category of cost in one setting but not in another. For example, 
administrative/marketing costs for a purely informational intervention may be the most significant costs of the 
intervention, and we would therefore include them in our cost accounting. However, for grant programs or tax 
credits, administrative/marketing costs are small compared to the total amount of money transferred, so accounting 
for them would not significantly affect our estimates. Thus, we do not explicitly incorporate such costs. 
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increase of $200 per employee. We estimate that the cost of including the savings plan 
enrollment form in the information packet for new hires and following up with the 5% of 
employees who failed to return the form was approximately $2 per employee, so the active 
decision nudge generated $100 of additional savings per dollar spent. 
Perhaps the best-known nudge for promoting savings in workplace retirement accounts is 
to enroll employees automatically and/or to use automatic escalation to increase their 
contribution rates. Automatic enrollment is effective because people exhibit inertia, which favors 
sticking to defaults; because people infer that policy makers are recommending the default 
option; and because defaults become reference points, making deviations from the default feel 
like losses, which loom larger than gains (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). The most definitive study 
of savings plan automatic enrollment uses data from Denmark (Chetty, Friedman, Leth-Petersen, 
Nielsen, & Olsen, 2014). Changing the fraction of an individual’s salary that is automatically 
directed to a retirement account can generate savings changes of several percentage points of 
annual salary at essentially zero cost if the infrastructure for payroll deduction into a retirement 
account already exists.10 By contrast, the same paper studies a reduction in the tax deduction 
available for contributions to a particular type of retirement account, showing that this traditional 
policy change reduced contributions by 2,449 DKr, or $540 in U.S. dollars, and increased 
government revenues by 883 DKr, or $195 in U.S. dollars, for each person affected by the 
change, implying the tax deduction generated only $2.77 of additional savings in this type of 
account per dollar of government expenditure.11 
                                                            
10 Madrian and Shea (2001) and Card and Ransom (2011) study automatic enrollment and related nudges and find 
similar results. 
11 We convert Danish kroner to U.S. dollars using the 6.5-to-1 exchange rate preferred by Chetty et al. (2014), and 
we then adjust from 1999 to 2015 price levels. Chetty et al. (2014) also study the extent to which savings increases 
in a retirement account caused by changes to automatic contributions or caused by changes to tax incentives are 
offset by savings decreases in an individual’s other financial accounts. The offset is minor in the case of changes to 
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Duflo and Saez (2003) tested a (traditional) educational intervention, offering a 
university’s employees $20 to attend a benefits fair to receive information about their retirement 
savings plan. This intervention increased plan contributions over the next year by $58.95 at a 
cost of $4.04 per employee, generating $14.58 in additional contributions in the year per dollar 
spent.12 
Duflo, Gale, Liebman, Orszag, and Saez (2006) provided clients of a tax-preparation 
company matching contributions for deposits to a retirement savings account. Clients who were 
offered a 20% [50%] match contributed $76.9 [$162.1] more to the account relative to the 
control group and received average matching contributions of $16.7 [$82.4], for total 
incremental contributions of $93.6 [$244.5] per treated client, and a mere $5.59 [$2.97] in total 
contributions per dollar of matching expenditures. 
Duflo et al. (2006) also calculated the effect of tax credits on retirement account 
contributions, but we focus on the results from a companion paper (Duflo, Gale, Liebman, 
Orszag, & Saez, 2007) devoted specifically to studying these tax credits. The authors estimate 
that an increase in the tax credit from 20% to 50% of contributions generates an additional $11.6 
of deposits to a retirement account, from an average of $12.0 to $23.5. This increase translates to 
just $11.6/(0.5*23.5–0.2*12.0)=$1.24 of retirement savings per dollar of tax credits. 
Increasing College Enrollment among Recent High School Graduates 
When H&R Block tax professionals facilitated the process of filing the Free Application 
for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) for their clients, high school seniors whose families received 
                                                            
automatic contributions. However, when savings in a retirement account respond to changes to tax incentives for the 
account, this response is almost completely offset by adjustments in other accounts. The other papers that we 
analyze do not report results regarding the extent of such offsetting because the data are not available. 
12 Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2011) analyze a similar intervention but do not find a statistically significant impact, 
so the Duflo and Saez (2003) results are potentially overly optimistic. 
SHOULD GOVERNMENTS INVEST MORE IN NUDGING? 14 
 
 
the assistance were 8.1 percentage points more likely to attend college the following year. The 
incremental cost of this nudge intervention over the control group was $53.02 per participant. 
Thus, it produced 1.53 additional college enrollees per thousand dollars spent (Bettinger et al., 
2012). This streamlined personalized assistance nudge likely reduced procrastination by making 
the FAFSA easier to complete, alleviating anxiety about making errors, reducing the stigma for 
low socioeconomic status individuals associated with filling out the FAFSA, and increasing the 
salience and perceived value of completing it. When this nudge was replaced with a more 
traditional educational intervention providing families with details about their aid eligibility, 
there was a statistically insignificant decrease in college enrollment relative to the untreated 
control group (Bettinger et al., 2012). 
Turning to monetary incentives, Dynarski (2003) estimated the effect of the Social 
Security Student Benefit Program, a federal subsidy for post-secondary education, on college 
enrollment. The elimination of benefit eligibility reduced attendance rates for affected students 
by 18.2 percentage points.13 The average annual subsidy for each student in 1980 was $9,252, 
and 56% of the eligible group attended college for a cost per eligible individual of $5,181. The 
program therefore generated 0.182/5,181*1,000=0.0351 additional college enrollees per 
thousand dollars spent.14 This impact per thousand dollars spent is approximately 40 times 
smaller than the corresponding impact of the Bettinger et al. (2012) nudge. 
Long (2004a) studied state higher education subsidies for enrollment in public 
universities. Long’s estimates indicate that in the absence of any state support, 5,535 students in 
                                                            
13 This study evaluated the elimination of an incentive rather than the addition of an incentive, which may not have 
symmetric effects given past research showing that losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
14 Linsenmeier, Rosen, and Rouse (2006) and Conley and Taber (2011) do not find statistically significant estimates 
of the effect of grants on college enrollment. We focus on the Dynarski (2003) results as a potentially overly 
optimistic view of the effect of educational subsidies. 
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the sample would enroll in college. If the state provided vouchers proportional to the expected 
years of study, 5,664 students would enroll, with 3,766 in four-year colleges and 1,898 in two-
year colleges. According to the working paper version of the article, the vouchers provide $5,367 
per student at a four-year college and $2,683 per student at a two-year college. The total voucher 
expenditure would therefore be (3,766*$5,367+1,898*$2,683)=$25.3 million. The educational 
vouchers therefore increased college enrollment by just (5,664–5,535)/25,300,000*1,000 = 
0.0051 students per thousand dollars spent. 
Two studies of tax incentives for college enrollment examining the Hope, Lifetime 
Learning, and American Opportunity Tax Credits estimate that these produce no measurable 
increases in college attendance (Long, 2004b; Bulman & Hoxby, 2015). 
Increasing Energy Conservation 
Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, and Griskevicius (2007) and Allcott and Rogers 
(2014) considered the effects of nudging households to reduce electricity consumption by 
sending them letters comparing their energy use to that of their neighbors. This intervention 
harnesses both competitiveness and the power of social norms. Allcott and Rogers (2014) 
directed readers to Allcott (2011) for simpler cost effectiveness calculations for the program. We 
focus on the Allcott (2011) calculations for this reason and because they are based on much 
larger sample sizes than the Schultz et al. (2007) analysis. Allcott (2011) found that the program 
averaged $0.0367 ($0.0331 in 2009 dollars) of expenditure for each kWh of electricity saved 
over the course of approximately two years, or saved 27.3 kWh per dollar spent.15 
Asensio and Delmas (2015) studied a nudge that strategically framed information 
provided to households from meters recording appliance-level electricity usage. Giving 
                                                            
15 Allcott and Mullainathan (2010) report similar results. 
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households access to a webpage with this information along with messages linking pollution 
from electricity usage to health and environmental issues, perhaps sparking moral concerns 
(Haidt, 2001), reduced electricity consumption by 8.192 percent, or (0.0819*8.66*100)=70.9 
kWh over the 100 day treatment period relative to the control group, which had baseline average 
electricity usage of 8.66 kWh per day. We assume energy savings decayed linearly over one 
year, translating to 149.8 kWh saved in total per household. The authors report (via private 
correspondence) that the cost of the treatment was $3,019 per household. The intervention thus 
saved an unremarkable 0.050 kWh per dollar spent. The authors also tested an alternative nudge 
providing information on electricity usage and messages linking usage to increased utility bills, 
seeking to increase the salience of the pain of paying (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998), and they did 
not find a statistically significant effect on electricity consumption.16 
In the category of economic incentives, when California utilities offered residential 
customers a 20% rebate off of their summer electricity bills in 2005 if they reduced usage by at 
least 20% relative to the previous year’s summer total, energy consumption during the summer 
decreased by 60.5 million kWh. Ito (2015) calculates that the program spent 29.3 cents (24.1 
cents in 2005 levels) for each kWh saved, and it therefore saved 3.41 kWh per dollar spent. 
Arimura, Li, Newell, and Palmer (2012) estimated the effect of demand-side management 
and energy efficiency policies, which combined education and incentives, using data from 307 
U.S. utilities from 1992-2006. They found that the programs, which operate over the course of 
several years, spent on average $0.071 ($0.050 in 1999 dollars) per kWh saved, and they saved 
an impressive 14.0 kWh per dollar spent. 
                                                            
16 Sexton (2015) demonstrated that withdrawing consumers from automatic electricity bill payment programs 
significantly reduced energy usage. This intervention does not fit into any of the traditional policy categories we 
evaluate; it comes closest to being a nudge. We exclude it from our analysis because it imposes significant 
transaction costs on consumers and therefore is not truly a nudge. 
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Increasing Adult Outpatient Influenza Vaccinations 
Milkman et al. (2011) studied a nudge prompting people to plan the date and time when 
they would obtain an influenza vaccination. Such prompts embed intentions more firmly in 
memory and associate cues like the intended time of action with the intended behavior, thereby 
reducing forgetfulness. They also help people think through logistical hurdles and strategies for 
overcoming those hurdles. Finally, they create a commitment that is uncomfortable to break 
(Rogers, Milkman, John, & Norton, 2015). The authors found that planning prompts increased 
flu shot take-up by 4.2 percentage points. Adding the prompts to reminder letters that were 
already being mailed required 5 hours of labor at a cost of $75 per hour in 2011 dollars, totaling 
$415.58 in 2015 dollars. With 1,270 employees receiving the prompts, the intervention generated 
(0.042*1,270)/415.58*100=12.8 additional vaccinations per $100 spent.  
Chapman et al. (2010) studied the effect of opt-out appointments (a nudge) on 
vaccination rates. As explained in the discussion of automatic savings plan enrollment, defaults 
capitalize on inertia, inferences about recommendations, and loss aversion. In the treatment 
group, individuals were automatically scheduled for vaccination appointments, while individuals 
in the control group were only given a web link to schedule their own appointments. In both 
conditions, participants were not penalized for missing appointments, and they could walk into 
the clinic without an appointment. The opt-out treatment increased the vaccination rate by 11.7 
percentage points over the opt-in control. In follow-up correspondence, one of the authors 
estimated that a clinic faces a cost of $1.25 for each request to change (cancel/add/reschedule) an 
appointment, a cost of $5 to add staff for each extra appointment, and a cost of $30 for stocking 
each extra unused vaccine. In the opt-out group, 39 people changed or cancelled appointments. 
In the opt-in group, 50 people scheduled appointments (none were changed or cancelled). 
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We assume that a clinic must provide enough staff to cover the number of people who 
have appointments or the number of people who keep their appointment plus the number of 
walk-ins, whichever is greater, for a total of 221 appointments for the opt-out group and 80 
appointments and walk-ins for the opt-in group. We also assume that clinics accurately anticipate 
the proportion of people who keep their automatic appointments, making the number of vaccines 
that expire negligible. The opt-out condition then has a total cost of 
($1.25*39+$5*221)=$1,153.75 in 2009 dollars, while the opt-in condition has a total cost of 
($1.25*50+$5*80)=$462.50 in 2009 dollars, so the inflation-adjusted marginal cost of the opt-
out condition is $766.06. Given that 239 people were in the treatment group, the opt-out nudge 
generated (0.117*239)/766.06*100=3.65 additional vaccinations per hundred dollars spent. 
As for price-based policies, Bronchetti, Huffman, and Magnenheim (2015) found that 
offering a $30 incentive ($31.07 in 2015 dollars) increased vaccination rates at campus clinics by 
10.7 percentage points. The baseline vaccination rate in the control group was 8.7%, so the 
treatment generated just 0.107/(31.07*(0.107+0.087))*100=1.78 additional vaccinations per 
hundred dollars spent. 
Kimura, Nguyen, Higa, Hurwitz, and Vugia (2007) examined the effect of education and 
free workplace vaccination clinics. Applying a difference-in-differences approach to their 
findings, we calculate that the educational campaign increased vaccination rates by 8.19 
percentage points, while free vaccinations increased vaccination rates by 15.3 percentage points. 
The authors estimated that an educational campaign for 100 employees costs $92.54, while free 
vaccinations cost $1,427.77. The educational and free vaccination treatments therefore generated 
an impressive (8.19/92.54)*100=8.85 and a less remarkable (15.3/1,427.77)*100=1.07 additional 
vaccinations per hundred dollars spent, respectively.
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Table 2. 
Panel A. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting retirement savings. 
 
Authors Treatment Impact Cost Relative effectiveness 
Carroll et al. 
(2009) 
New employees at a company were required 
to indicate their preferred contribution rate 
in a workplace retirement savings plan 
within their first month of employment 
$200 increase in 
savings plan 
contributions per 
employeea 
$2 per employee for 
distributing form and 
for following up with 
employees who did not 
respond 
$100 increase in 
savings plan 
contributions per $1 
spenta 
Chetty et al. 
(2014) 
The Danish government changed the tax 
deduction for contributions to one type of 
pension account for the roughly 20% of 
earners who were in the top tax bracket 
$540 (27) change in 
contributions to the 
affected pension account 
per person affected 
$195 change in 
government revenue per 
person affected 
$2.77 (0.14) change in 
contributions to the 
affected pension account 
per $1 spent 
Duflo and 
Saez (2003) 
Monetary inducements were offered to 
employees of a large university for attending a 
benefits fair where they would receive 
information about the retirement savings plan 
$58.95 increase in 
savings plan 
contributions per 
employeea 
$4.04 per employee for 
monetary inducements 
$14.58 increase in 
savings plan 
contributions per $1 
spenta 
Duflo et al. 
(2006) 
Clients preparing a tax return at offices in low- 
and middle-income neighborhoods in St. Louis 
were offered 20%, 50%, or no matching 
contributions for the first $1000 of additional 
contributions to a retirement savings account 
20% match: $93.6 (9.0) 
in incremental 
contributions per person; 
50% match: $244.5 
(12.8) in incremental 
contributions per person 
20% match: $16.7 in 
matching dollars per 
person; 
50% match: $82.4 in 
matching dollars per 
person 
20% match: $5.59 (0.54) 
increase in contributions 
per $1 spent; 
50% match: $2.97 (0.16) 
increase in contributions 
per $1 spent 
Duflo et al. 
(2007) 
The U.S. federal government increased the tax 
credit on the first $2000 of retirement savings 
from 20% to 50% when adjusted gross income 
dropped below a threshold 
$11.6 (1.00) increase in 
retirement account 
contributions per person 
$9.35 increase in tax 
credits per person 
$1.24 (0.11) increase in 
retirement account 
contributions per $1 
spent 
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs 
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated 
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention. 
aFor this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported. 
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Table 2 continued. 
Panel B. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting college enrollment. 
 
Authors Treatment Impact Cost Relative effectiveness 
Bettinger et 
al. (2012) 
Tax professionals offered to help low-
income families fill out financial aid forms 
and calculate potential aid amounts at the 
time of tax preparation 
8.1 (3.5) percentage 
point increase in 
likelihood of attending 
college the next year 
$53.02 per participant 
for training and pay of 
tax professionals, 
materials, software, 
and call center support 
1.53 (0.66) additional 
students enrolled in 
college within the next 
year per $1,000 spent 
Dynarski 
(2003) 
The Social Security Student Benefit Program 
gave out monthly stipends to young adults 
enrolled in college with a parent who was 
eligible for benefits as a federal post-
secondary educational subsidy until the 1980s 
18.2 (9.6) percentage 
point change in 
likelihood of attending 
college 
$5,181 per eligible 
person for stipends 
0.0351 (0.0185) 
additional students 
enrolled in college per 
$1,000 spent 
Long (2004a) Some states offered state education subsidies 
for students attending their in-state public 
universities 
2.3 percent increase in 
number of students 
attending college (5,535 
to 5,664 students)a,b 
$4,468 per college 
student ($25.3 million 
total) for subsidiesb 
0.0051 additional 
students enrolled in 
college per $1,000 spenta
Long 
(2004b); 
Bulman and 
Hoxby (2015) 
The federal government offered the Hope, 
Lifetime Learning, and American Opportunity 
Tax Credits to subsidize spending on higher 
education 
Negligible effect  Negligible effect 
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs 
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated 
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention. 
aFor this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported. 
bIt was not possible to calculate a figure that is strictly comparable to the other figures in the same column. 
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Table 2 continued. 
Panel C. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting energy conservation. 
 
Authors Treatment Impact Cost Relative effectiveness 
Allcott 
(2011) 
An independent company sent reports to 
residential consumers that contained both 
comparisons to neighbors’ electricity usage 
and tips for conservation 
2.0 percent reduction 
in energy usage on 
averagea 
Approximately $1 per 
report, with reports 
sent monthly, bi-
monthly, or quarterly 
27.3 kWh saved per $1 
spenta 
Asensio and 
Delmas 
(2015) 
Researchers granted residential consumers 
access to a website sharing their detailed 
appliance-level electricity usage 
information, with messages either linking 
this usage to health and environmental 
issues or to increased utility bills 
Health/environmental 
messages: 8.192 (4.306) 
percent reduction in 
energy usage; 
Billing-oriented 
messages: negligible 
effect 
$3,019 per household Health/environmental 
messages: 0.050 (0.026) 
kWh saved per $1 
spent; 
Billing-oriented 
messages: negligible 
effect 
Ito (2015) Residents in California received discounts on 
their electricity bills if they reduced their 
summer energy usage by at least 20% relative 
to the previous summer 
4.2 (1.3) percent 
reduction in energy 
usage in inland areas 
and negligible effect in 
coastal areas 
$3.70 per customer for 
rebates plus $1.39 per 
customer for 
administrative and 
marketing costs 
3.41 kWh saved per $1 
spenta 
Arimura et al. 
(2012) 
Utilities provided incentives and education to 
reduce energy usage during peak times and 
promote efficiency investments 
0.9 (0.5) percent 
reduction in energy 
usage during 
intervention period and 
1.8 (1.1) percent 
reduction when 
including effects in 
future periods 
$10.83 per customer on 
average 
14.0 kWh saved per $1 
spenta 
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs 
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated 
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention. 
aFor this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported. 
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Table 2 continued. 
Panel D. Relative effectiveness of interventions targeting influenza vaccination. 
 
Authors Treatment Impact Cost Relative effectiveness 
Milkman et 
al. (2011) 
An employer modified the normal 
informational mailings regarding free flu 
shot clinics to prompt employees to write 
down details about when they planned to 
obtain vaccinations 
4.2 (1.9) percentage 
point increase in flu 
shot take-up 
$0.33 per employee for 
adding planning 
prompts to reminder 
letters 
12.8 (5.8) additional 
people vaccinated per 
$100 spent 
Chapman et 
al. (2010) 
A university automatically assigned its 
faculty and staff to (non-mandatory) flu 
shot appointment times 
11.7 (4.5) percentage 
point increase in flu 
shot take-up 
$3.21 per person for 
excess (unutilized) 
clinic capacity 
3.65 (1.40) additional 
people vaccinated per 
$100 spent 
Bronchetti et 
al. (2015) 
Experimenters paid college students a $30 
incentive to get a flu shot at the campus clinic 
10.7 (0.9) percentage 
point increase in flu shot 
take-up 
$6.03 per eligible 
student for incentive 
1.78 (0.15) additional 
people vaccinated per 
$100 spent 
Kimura et al. 
(2007) 
Conducted an educational campaign on the 
benefits of influenza vaccination; 
 
 
Provided free onsite influenza vaccines 
Education: 8.19 
percentage point 
increase in flu shot take-
upa 
Free vaccines: 15.3 
percentage point 
increase in flu shot take-
upa 
Education: $0.93 per 
employee 
 
 
Free vaccines: $14.28 
per employee 
Education: 8.85 
additional people 
vaccinated per $100 
spenta 
Free vaccines: 1.07 
additional people 
vaccinated per $100 
spenta 
Note: Interventions in bold are nudges. Interventions in normal typeface are traditional interventions (financial incentives, educational programs 
or some combination of the two). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors for the relative effectiveness measure are calculated 
by scaling the standard errors for the overall impact by the cost of the intervention, ignoring any uncertainty regarding the cost of the intervention. 
aFor this estimate, standard errors could not be calculated using the information reported. 
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Figure 1. 
Relative effectiveness of interventions in four domains. 
(financial incentives, educational 
programs or some combination the two) 
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Discussion 
The contribution of this paper is to extract critical new information from past work by 
calculating comparable relative effectiveness numbers and examining them side by side to 
illustrate how different interventions measure up on this important dimension. The results hardly 
provide an exhaustive review of the relative effectiveness of nudges compared to traditional 
policy tools, such as bans and incentives. Nonetheless, our selective but systematic calculations 
indicate that the impact of nudges is often greater, on a cost-adjusted basis, than that of 
traditional tools.   
In which situations are nudges more impactful per dollar spent than traditional policy 
tools and vice versa (Goldin and Lawson, 2016)? Far more work needs to be done on this 
question (ibid.), but monetary incentives may well do better, along that dimension, when the 
policy maker’s objective is to correct a misalignment between the public interest and the private 
interests of citizens making carefully reasoned decisions (as in cases where private decisions 
impose externalities). To be sure, nudges can help even there, and sometimes they may be 
preferable (Sunstein and Reisch, 2014). But their comparative advantages will typically be 
greater when the policy maker’s objective is to change the day-to-day behavior of individuals 
who are making biased, rushed, or otherwise imperfect decisions. As seen in Table 2, monetary 
incentives in these settings can generate large increases in desirable behavior, but are sometimes 
too expensive to generate a favorable ratio of impact to cost. Because traditional interventions 
seek to change behavior by altering the cost-benefit calculation that individuals undertake when 
focusing on a particular decision, these interventions face the challenge that individuals’ ability 
(and desire) to engage high-level cognitive capacities is often limited (Shah, Mullainathan, & 
Shafir, 2012). Nudges, by contrast, can succeed by taking account of individuals’ intuitions, 
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emotions, and automatic decision-making processes. These processes can be triggered with 
simple cues and subtle changes to the choice environment, so nudges can be effective yet cheap, 
generating high impact per dollar spent. 
Should nudges therefore replace traditional policy tools? Sometimes, but we warn against 
jumping to this conclusion. Nudges cannot be the only tool for pursuing policy objectives. In 
many cases, nudges make it easier for individuals to take advantage of policies that are already in 
place. For example, the retirement savings active decision nudge directed greater attention to an 
existing savings plan; the FAFSA intervention increased college attendance by simplifying the 
process of applying for student aid programs; and the vaccination planning prompts helped 
individuals to focus on how they could follow through on the intention to attend an existing free 
workplace clinic. Savings plan automatic enrollment and default flu shot appointments required 
no up-front effort on the part of individuals, but nonetheless started them down the path of 
engaging with existing savings plans and free vaccination clinics, respectively. 
An important caveat to our calculations is that they are not apples-to-apples exercises: 
they compare the effectiveness of different interventions without holding fixed the population 
studied. We lack sufficient studies comparing multiple policy interventions simultaneously 
across similar populations. It would also be desirable to examine additional consequences of 
interventions beyond their effects on the narrow behavior targeted (e.g., costs incurred by 
individuals as they react to the interventions; see Allcott and Kessler, 2015). Importantly, the 
operational philosophy of nudging is to test competing behavioral interventions and then to cull 
ineffective ones from the portfolio of nudges. This rapid testing cycle—along with the low cost 
of deploying most nudges in the first place—increases the likelihood that failures will be 
inexpensive. 
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Conclusion 
We offer three recommendations. First, there should be increased investment in 
behaviorally-informed policies to supplement traditional policies both inside and outside of 
governments. Second, nudge units and others enlisting nudges should share data and knowledge 
(e.g., through a central repository) and coordinate efforts to maximize their learning from one 
another. Tracking failures is as important for knowledge creation as tracking successes. Third, 
behavioral scientists should measure relative effectiveness explicitly in their studies in order to 
quantify the impact of nudge interventions compared to other available policy tools (and to learn 
which nudge interventions work best). Nudging has entered government in the U.K., in the U.S., 
and far beyond, but in light of growing evidence of its relative effectiveness, we believe that 
policymakers should nudge more. 
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